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Abstract—We explore the link between data representation
and soft errors in dot products. We present an analytic model
for the absolute error introduced should a soft error corrupt
a bit in an IEEE-754 floating-point number. We show how this
finding relates to the fundamental linear algebra concepts of
normalization and matrix equilibration. We present a case study
illustrating that the probability of experiencing a large error in
a dot product is minimized when both vectors are normalized.
Furthermore, when data is normalized we show that the absolute
error is less than one or very large, which allows us to detect
large errors. We demonstrate how this finding can be used by
instrumenting the GMRES iterative solver. We count all possible
errors that can be introduced through faults in arithmetic in the
computationally intensive orthogonalization phase, and show that
when scaling is used the absolute error can be bounded above
by one.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the field of high-end computing (HEC) the notion of re-
liability has tended to focus on keeping thousands of physical
nodes operating cooperatively for extended periods of time.
As chip manufacturing and power requirements continue to
advance, soft errors are becoming more apparent [1]. This
implies that reliability research must address the case that
the machine does not crash, but that outputs during com-
putation may be silently incorrect. There have been many
studies into hardening numerical kernels against soft errors,
that is the researchers attempt to preserve the illusion of a
reliable machine by detecting and correcting all soft errors.
We take a more analytical approach. Instead of focusing on
detection/correction, we seek to study how the data operated
on impacts the errors that we can observe given soft errors in
data — called silent data corruption (SDC).
The driving motivation behind our work is the uncertainty
surrounding the reliability of an exascale-class machine [2],
[3], [4]. We attempt to avoid speculation over what hardware
may be used in future (or present) HEC deployments, and
instead analyze how a single soft error in an IEEE-754
floating-point number behaves. It has already been shown that
existing and decommissioned HEC deployments have suffered
from SDC [1], [5]. For the prior reasons, we seek to study
the link between the data operated on and soft errors. We
intentionally perform our research subject to the IEEE 754
specification, which we believe will be used regardless of the
architecture. We also restrict our analysis to single bit flips.
This gives us a base line from which to draw higher-level
conclusions related to multiple bit flips, and lets us isolate the
impact of a bit flip.
IEEE 754 both defines the binary representation of data,
and bounds the rounding error committed by arithmetic
operations. This work focuses on data representation. The
effects of rounding error on numerical algorithms, including
those studied in this paper, have been extensively studied;
see e.g., [6]. However, these results generally only apply to
small errors, such as those resulting from rounding. Bit flips
can be huge and thus require different methods of analysis,
like those presented in this paper.
We present the following contributions:
• We model single bit upsets in IEEE-754 scalars analyti-
cally, and extend this modeling to dot products.
• We demonstrate both experimentally (via Monte Carlo
sampling) and analytically that dot products performed
on normalized numbers have a significantly lower prob-
ability of experiencing large error than dot products with
values of varying magnitudes.
• We relate our finding that normalized vectors minimize
absolute error to matrix equilibration, and correlate this
finding to two highly used numerical kernels (Gram-
Schmidt orthogonalization and the Arnoldi process).
• We demonstrate the utility of our finding by instru-
menting the Generalized Minimum Residual Method
(GMRES). We show that for the dot product intensive
orthogonalization kernel, we can restrict errors arising
from single bit upsets to being less than one, or being
very large and easily detected.
• We articulate how studying single bit flips enables us to
draw conclusions about multiple bit upsets.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers have approached the problem of SDC in nu-
merical algorithms in various ways. Many take the approach
of treating an algorithm as a black box and observing the
behavior of these codes when run with soft errors injected.
Recently, [7], [8] analyzed the behavior of various Krylov
methods and observed the variance in iteration count based on
the data structure that experiences the bit flip. Shantharam et
al. [9] analyzed how bit flips in a sparse matrix-vector multiply
(SpMV) impact the L2 norm and observe the error as CG is
run. Bronevetsky et al. [10], [11] analyzed several iterative
methods documenting the impact of randomly injected bit flips
into specific data structures in the algorithms and evaluated
several detection/correction schemes in terms of overhead and
accuracy. Exemplifying the concept of black-box analysis,
[12] presents BIFIT for characterizing applications based on
their vulnerability to bit flips. Rather than focusing on how
to preserve the illusion of a reliable machine or devising a
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scheme to inject soft errors, we investigate an avenue mostly
ignored, which is how the data in the algorithm can be used
to mitigate the impact of a bit flip.
Hoemmen and Heroux proposed a radically different ap-
proach. Rather than attempt to detect and correct soft errors,
they use a “selective reliability” programming model to make
the algorithm converge through soft errors [13]. Sao and
Vuduc showed that reliably restarting iterative solvers enables
convergence in the presence of soft errors [14]. In the same
vein, Elliott et al. showed that bounding the error introduced
in the orthogonalization phase of GMRES lets FT-GMRES
converge with minimal impact on time to solution [15]. Boley
et al. apply backward error analysis to linear systems, in order
to distinguish small error due to rounding from inacceptably
large error due to transient hardware faults [16]. In general, our
work complements this line of research. While Hoemmen and
Sao have investigated algorithms that can converge through
error, we show that in certain numerical kernels, the data itself
can have a “bounding” effect. For example, coupled with [15],
we improve the likelihood that errors fall within the derived
bound.
Algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) provides an ap-
proach to detect (and optionally correct) faults, which comes
at the cost of increased memory consumption and reduced
performance [17], [18]. The ABFT work by Huang et al.
[17] was proven by Anfinson et al. [19] to work for several
matrix operations, and the checksum relationship in the input
checksum matrices is preserved at the end of the computation.
Consequently, by verifying this checksum relationship in the
final computation results, errors can be detected at the end
of the computation. Recent work has looked at extending
ABFT to additional matrix factorization algorithms [18] and
as an alternative to traditional checkpoint/restart techniques for
tolerating fail-stop failures [20], [21], [22].
Costs in terms of extra memory and computation required
for ABFT may be amortized for dense linear algebra, and such
overheads have been analyzed by many (e.g., [23], [24], [25]).
Algorithms must be manually redesigned for ABFT support
by accounting for numerical properties (e.g., invariants). A
more fundamental problem is that traditional checksums and
error-correcting codes do not suit floating-point computations
well [16]. Such computations naturally commit rounding error,
which exact (bitwise) codes forbid. Inexact codes (that use
floating-point sums) can be sensitive to rounding error, and
commit it themselves. It is possible that more expensive
recovery and significantly more redundant storage could help
[26]. However, works like [13], [14], [15], [16] suggest that
correcting faults might not be necessary, if their effects on
the algorithm are detectable and bounded. In general, this
paper favors “opening up the black box” and understanding
the effects of soft error on algorithms, rather than trying to
detect and correct all such errors before they affect algorithms’
behavior.
III. PROJECT OVERVIEW
To explore the relation between data representation and
soft errors, we first construct an analytic model of a soft error
in an IEEE-754 floating-point scalar, and then extend this to
a dot product. We uncover through analysis that the binary
pattern of the exponent can be exploited for fault tolerance.
We show this graphically via a case study using Monte Carlo
sampling of random vectors, and then extend the idea of data
scaling to matrices by using sparse matrix equilibration. To
demonstrate the feasibly and utility of our work we analyze
the GMRES algorithm and instrument the computationally
intensive orthogonalization phase. We count the possible
absolute errors that can be introduced via a bit flip in a dot
product, and show that scaling data lowers the likelihood of
observing large, undetectable errors.
This paper is organized as follows:
1) In Section IV, we construct an analytic model of the
absolute error for single bit upsets in IEEE-754 floating-
point numbers.
2) In Section V, we extend our model of faults in IEEE-
754 scalars to vectors of arbitrary values, and present
examples of how data scaling impacts the binary repre-
sentation and absolute error we can observe.
3) In Section VI, we perform a case study using Monte
Carlo sampling of 10,404,000,000 random vectors of
various magnitudes, and graphically show how the error
is minimized when operating on values less than 1.
4) In Section VII, we link data scaling to sparse matrix
equilibration, and instrument and evaluate the impact of
a soft error in the computationally intensive orthogonal-
ization phase of GMRES.
IV. FAULT MODEL
The premise of our work is that a silent, transient bit
flip impacts data. Before we can perform any analysis or
experimental work, we must define how such a bit flip would
impact an algorithm, and how we enforce that the bit flip was
transient. To achieve this goal, we build our model around the
basic concept that when an algorithm uses data, this translates
into some set of operations being performed on the data.
Should a bit flip perturb our data, some operation will use
a corrupt value, rather than the correct value. The output of
this single operation will then contain a tainted value, and this
tainted value could cause the solution to be incorrect. Note that
a transient bit flip may cause a persistent error in the output
depending on how the value is used.
A side benefit of an operation-centric model is that we
naturally avoid a pitfall to which arbitrary memory fault
injection succumbs, namely that if a bit flip impacts data (or
memory) that is never used (read) then this fault cannot lead to
a failure. Our fault model allows a bit flip to perturb the input
to an operation performed on the data, while not persistently
tainting the storage of the inputs. This mimics how a transient
bit flip would manifest itself, e.g., during ALU activities. As
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Fig. 1: Graphical representation of data layout in the IEEE-754
Binary64 specification.
a result, the data that experiences the bit flip need not show
signs that it was perturbed. This model allows us to observe the
impact of transient flips on the inputs, which results in sticky
or persistent error in the result. We then utilize mathematical
analysis to model how this persistent error propagates through
the algorithm.
A. Fault Characterization via Semantic Analysis
To derive a fault model we must first understand what a fault
is. Since floating-point numbers approximate real numbers and
most numerical algorithms use real numbers, we start from the
definition of a real-valued scalar γ ∈ R. The range of possible
values that γ can take is
γ ∈ [−∞,+∞].
We assume that the IEEE-754 specification for double-
precision numbers, called Binary64, is used to represent these
numbers. This means that γ can take a fixed set of numeric
values, and these values lie in the range
γ ∈ [−1.80× 10308,+1.80× 10308],
or using base two for the exponent
γ ∈ [−1.9¯× 21023,+1.9¯× 21023],
where 1.9¯ indicates the largest possible fractional component,
and 1.0 indicates the smallest fractional component. A more
informative range is that of |γ|, excluding 0 and denormalized
numbers,
|γ| ∈ [2.23× 10−308, 1.80× 10308], (1)
and in semi base two
|γ| ∈ [1.0× 2−1022, 1.9¯× 21023]. (2)
To approximate real numbers, Binary64 uses 64 bits, of
which 11 are devoted to the exponent, 52 for the fractional
component (we refer to as the mantissa), and one bit for the
sign. Figure 1 shows how these bits are laid out. In addition
to numeric values, Binary64 includes two non-numeric values,
Not-a-Number (NaN) and Infinity (Inf), which may be signed
to account for infinity and values that result in undefined
operations, e.g., division by zero. The range of values in
Equations (1) and (2) is not continuous and has non-uniform
gaps due to the discrete precision, which is a consequence of
having a fixed number of bits in the fractional component.
We can further discretize the range of possible values by
recognizing that there is a finite number of exponents that are
possible given IEEE-754 double precision, e.g.,
γ ∈ {0,±Inf,±NaN,±2−1022 × 1.x,±2−1021 × 1.x,
. . . ,±20 × 1.x, . . . ,±21023 × 1.x},
where 1.x indicates some fractional component.
Analytically, this is expressed as
γ = (−1)sign
(
1 +
51∑
i=0
bi2
i−52
)
× 2e−1023, (3)
for IEEE-754 Binary64. Note, the specification does not
include a sign bit for the exponent. Rather, IEEE floating
point numbers utilize a bias to allow the exponent to be
stored without a sign bit, which we will later exploit for fault-
resilience. Another important characteristic that stems from
the general approach of expressing numbers in exponential
notation is that we can characterize numbers by their order of
magnitude. Of particular interest is the following relation:
|2−1022| ≤ |2−1022 × 1.x|
< |2−1021| ≤ |2−1021 × 1.x| < . . .
< |20| ≤ |20 × 1.x| < . . .
< |21023| ≤ |21023 × 1.x|. (4)
This means that we can use the next order of magnitude as an
upper bound for errors in the fractional component of a number
— which is practically achieved by incrementing the exponent
or multiplying by two. We can also analytically model the
number of fractional bits that could contribute an error larger
than some tolerance, since the error that could arise from each
mantissa bit is relative to the exponent of the number. This
final step is necessary since the fractional term can take values
in the range [1, 2), where the left parenthesis indicates that 2
is not a member of this interval. We can also characterize
the error that a perturbed sign bit can contribute, and, like
the fractional component, this error is relative to the exponent
of the number. Suppose the sign is perturbed in a scalar γ,
then we have γ˜ = −γ, the absolute error is |γ − γ˜| = |γ −
(−γ)| = 2γ. This means we can bound the error from a sign
bit perturbation by incrementing the exponent of the resulting
value.
In summary, we have demonstrated that errors in IEEE-754
floating point numbers can be characterized using the exponent
of the numbers. This property allows us to reduce the number
of bits we need to consider in a fault model, since we know
that a large number of errors are bounded by the relatively
small set of possible exponents.
B. Fault Characteristics of Perturbed Exponents
In the context of IEEE-754 double precision numbers and
silent data corruption, we do not model the exponents directly.
Instead, we model the biased exponents, as they are the
interesting portion of the data that allows us to characterize
the errors that the majority of the bits present in the data
can produce. For instance, in double precision data we can
characterize the errors from 53 of the 64 bits using our
approach. This type of fault-characterization is impossible if
bit flips are injected randomly into the data’s memory, as
that approach loses the semantic information that is implicitly
present in the data.
The Binary64 specification does not store exponents di-
rectly, instead it uses a bias of 1023. From § IV-A this means
we can characterize all faults in double precision data by
analyzing perturbations to the possible biased exponents
{0, 1, 2, . . . , 1023, . . . , 2046}.
Note that zero is not a biased exponent and has special
meaning. In IEEE-754, a zero pattern in the exponent with
zeros in the mantissa is used to represent the scalar zero,
while a non-zero pattern in the mantissa is used to represent
subnormal numbers. We also assume the user does not perform
computation on the two non-numeric values NaN and Inf,
which are represented using the biased exponent 2047 (all
ones). We do include zero in our analysis because it is a valid
real number.
Since we are concerned with bit perturbations in the expo-
nent, we express the biased exponents in their binary form,
e.g., 11-bit unsigned integers presented in binary. We can
2
−1
20
21
 ⇒
10221023
1024
 ⇒
0111111111001111111111
10000000000

Exponent Biased Storage
Fig. 2: Relation of exponent, IEEE-754 double precision bias,
and what data are actually stored.
further expand Figure 2 to show the potential change to the
original exponent should a bit flip occur, which will form the
basis for our fault model and analytic models.
In the context of bit flips, we can view a bit flip as adding or
subtracting from the biased exponent, which in turn translates
to multiplying or dividing the number by some power of two.
We model the impact of a bit flip in the exponent as the
original scalar being magnified or minimized by a specific
power of two. We illustrate this in Figure 3, where reading left-
to-right, we have some initial exponent, which is represented
using a bias of 1023. The biased exponent translates to a
discrete binary pattern. We consider all single bit flips in this
binary pattern and compute the actual perturbed exponent.
Note, that the perturbation can be modeled independent of
the original exponent.
By characterizing the error introduced, we recognize that all
mantissa bit flips introduce error that has the same exponent
as the original number, and a sign bit flip introduces error
that is only one order of magnitude larger than the original
number. Furthermore, the exponent bits can either introduce
large error, or a bit flip introduces error roughly equivalent to
the order of magnitude of the original number.
Suppose we can enforce that all numbers used in calcu-
lations are less than 1.0, then we know that the majority of
the bits will produce error that is also less than one, since
51 of the total 52 mantissa bits will contribute an error less
than 1.0. We also see that some of the exponent bits have the
potential to contribute an error less than 1.0, which indicates
if we can enforce or assume some properties of the data
used in the calculations e.g., data less than one, then we can
greatly increase the likelihood that a bit flip introduces an error
no greater than 1.0. This phenomena is shown in Figure 3,
where we show empirically that numbers with exponent 20
introduce a small error compared to the errors introduced with
the exponent 21.
In summary, the exponent characterizes the error introduced
by the sign or mantissa should a bit flip occur. As discussed
in § IV-A and analytically presented in Eq. (4), we are able to
relate bit upsets to numerical error in terms of the exponent
of the original number. Table I summarizes these analytical
bounds for a bit upset in a scalar and highlights the change in
order of magnitude. Now that we have characterized a fault
in a scalar, we will present a fault model centered around
operations on scalars assuming one will be perturbed.
C. Operation Centric Fault Model
This work distinguishes itself from related work in the field
of silent data corruption by developing a fault model that is
not based on perturbing arbitrary memory locations. We seek
a fault model and experimental methodology that expresses all
possible errors, and not the expected error, which is what is
obtained through random sampling.
1) Fault Model for Dot Products: We now describe a
realization of our fault model that describes the error that
could be injected if an operation in a dot product experiences
a single bit upset. We choose the dot product because it is
a common operation, and because we will use this model in
§ VII to model the worst-case errors that could be injected
into a phase of the GMRES algorithm.
Given two real-valued n-dimensional vectors a,b ∈ Rn,
the dot product is defined as
c =
n∑
i=1
ci, where ci = aibi. (5)
If we allow a single bit flip to impact the i-th element of the
dot product, then we have a perturbed solution c˜, which is the
result of a perturbation to either ai, bi, or ci. In the context of
our fault model, this captures a bit upset impacting the inputs
to the multiplication operator, and it captures a bit upset in
the intermediate value, ci, which is the input to the addition
operator.
Using Table I, we have all of the tools necessary to compose
an absolute error model for a dot product, i.e., addition is
modeled by a fault in a scalar |α+ β − (α˜+ β)| = |α− α˜|.
The potential change in order of magnitude is paramount.
Consider an exponent flip from 1 → 0. These types of
exponent bit flips produce an error that is bounded above by
the original magnitude of the result, which can be viewed as
2−1 ⇒ 1022 ⇒ 01111111110 ⇒

01111111111
01111111100
01111111010
01111110110
01111101110
01111011110
01110111110
01101111110
01011111110
00111111110
11111111110

⇒

20 = 2−1 × 2+1
2−3 = 2−1 × 2−2
2−5 = 2−1 × 2−4
2−9 = 2−1 × 2−8
2−17 = 2−1 × 2−16
2−33 = 2−1 × 2−32
2−65 = 2−1 × 2−64
2−129 = 2−1 × 2−128
2−257 = 2−1 × 2−256
2−513 = 2−1 × 2−512
21023 = 2−1 × 21024

20 ⇒ 1023 ⇒ 01111111111 ⇒

01111111110
01111111101
...
00111111111
11111111111

⇒

2−1 = 20 × 2−1
2−2 = 20 × 2−2
...
2−512 = 20 × 2−512
21024 = Inf or NaN

21 ⇒ 1024 ⇒ 10000000000 ⇒

10000000001
10000000010
...
11000000000
00000000000

⇒

22 = 21 × 2+1
23 = 21 × 2+2
...
2513 = 21 × 2+512
Zero or Subnormal

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unperturbed Data
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Possible Binary
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Result
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Perturbation
Fig. 3: Examples of how a bit flip can impact an exponent represented using the IEEE-754 Binary64 specification.
TABLE I: Bit flip absolute error for a scalar λ represented using IEEE-754 double precision, with λ = λexp × λfrac. Where
λexp is the exponent 2x, and λfrac is the fractional component.
Bit Location Absolute Error Bit Range ∆ Order†
Scalar:
∣∣∣λ− λ˜∣∣∣ Multiplication: |αβ − α˜β|
Mantissa
∣∣λexp(1 + 2j−52)∣∣ ∣∣αexp(1 + 2j−52)β∣∣ for j = 0, . . . , 51 0
Exponent1→0
∣∣∣λ(1− 2−2j )∣∣∣ ∣∣∣αβ(1− 2−2j )∣∣∣ for j = 0, . . . , 10 and bitj+52 = 1 −2j
Exponent0→1
∣∣∣λ(1− 22j )∣∣∣ ∣∣∣αβ(1− 22j )∣∣∣ for j = 0, . . . , 10 and bitj+52 = 0 +2j
Sign |2λ| |2αβ| 1
† The change in order of magnitude.
“zeroing out” the term if a perturbation occurs. Similar to a
perturbed scalar, the mantissa can contribute either no change
in the order of magnitude, or in the worst case a bit flip causes
a carry, which will increment the order of magnitude by one.
The order of magnitude for a sign bit flip is exactly the same
as that of a perturbed scalar, which introduces an error one
order of magnitude larger than the result. These error models
can be thought of as the largest additive error that we can
inject into a dot product from a bit flip, e.g.,
c˜ =
n∑
i=1
aibi + (error term). (6)
In summary, we have composed analytic models for the the
absolute error that could be introduced into a dot product. Our
models are initially constructed from the IEEE-754 Binary64
model, which we extended to express how a bit upset impacts
a singular double precision scalar. We then composed a model
for the multiplication operator, and analytically expressed the
absolute error. Using the absolute error, we have a model that
explains how wrong a dot product can be, assuming a bit flip
in one of the input vectors or in an intermediate value. Next,
we refine these models to construct strict upper bounds on the
error introduced by a bit flip in a dot product.
2) Error Bounds for a Bit Flip in a Dot Product: The
models presented in Table I make no assumptions about
the bits present in the mantissa of the operands. This is
problematic if we want to consider all possible errors that
could be introduced into a dot product. To account for the
mantissa, and to create strict upper bounds on the error, we
will use the relation presented in Eq. 4. From this relation, we
know that αβ < 2αexponent+12βexponent+1. We can write this as
αβ < 4αexpβexp, (7)
where αexp = 2αexponent . Using Eq (7), we are able to account
for the mantissa bits, but we can also show that a bit flip in
the sign is bounded by Eq. (7). The sign bit introduces an
absolute error equivalent to incrementing the exponent of the
result
αβ < 2αβ < 4αexpβexp, (8)
where 2αβ is the potential error introduced should the sign
bit be perturbed, which must be smaller than the bound
constructed for the mantissa.
By utilizing Eq. (7), we are able to account for all possible
mantissas and their potential faults, as well as a perturbation
to the sign bit. We will now discuss how to use this model to
understand the relationship between the data in an algorithm
and the distribution of potential errors that could occur should
a bit flip in the data.
V. FAULT MODEL EVALUATION
In Section IV we proposed analytic models for errors should
a bit flip occur in IEEE-754 double precision data. We now
illustrate how data can impact the size of errors that a bit flip
can create. Consider the following sample vectors
usmall =
[
0.5
0.25
]
, vsmall =
[
0.25
0.5
]
, and
ularge =
[
2
4
]
, vlarge =
[
4
2
]
.
If we compute the dot product λ = ularge · vlarge, we have a
finite number of potential errors should a bit flip in the data
of ularge,vlarge, or in an intermediate value in the summation.
We can experience either 2˜×4+4×2, 2× 4˜+4×2, or 8˜+8.
We have previously shown what 2˜ can be (in Figure 3), but
for clarity we will state what the perturbed values could be (in
Figure 4). By inspection it is clear that substituting any of the
2˜ =

22
23
25
29
217
233
265
2129
2257
2513
Zero

, 4˜ =

21
24
26
210
218
234
266
2130
2258
2514
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Fig. 4: Example of perturbed values for large numbers.
above perturbed scalars into the dot product will produce an
absolute error greater than one in all cases, and in the event
one chooses to substitute the near zero perturbed values, the
absolute error of the dot product still has magnitude 8, e.g.,
|16− (0 + 8)|.
Alternatively, consider the vectors usmall and vsmall. If we
compute the dot product, λ = usmall · vsmall = 0.25. Then
we have possible values to perturb: 0˜.5, 0˜.25, and 0˜.125. We
construct these from our model of a perturbed scalar, and
present the perturbed variants in Figure 5. By inspection, 0˜.5
0˜.5 =
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Fig. 5: Example of perturbed values for small numbers.
can contribute an absolute error to the dot product larger
than one only once, e.g.,
∣∣0.25− (21022 × 0.25 + 0.125)∣∣.
Likewise, 0˜.25 and 0˜.125 can perturb the result of the dot
product with error greater than one only once, and for all 3
cases the perturbation will change the result by hundreds of
orders of magnitude.
Returning to Figure 3 explains what causes bit flips in
the exponent to produce either a majority of large or small
errors. The binary pattern of the stored biased exponent
contains predominantly zeros for numbers greater than one,
and predominantly ones for numbers less than one.
One could also obtain primarily ones in the exponent as you
approach the extrema of the biased exponents, i.e., numbers
larger than 2512. In this case, the biased exponent does contain
many ones, however, because the number is sufficiently large,
i.e., the absolute error will remain considerably large. This
is because if one “zeroes out” a perturbed element in the dot
product, the error is proportional to the magnitude of the result.
A. Faults in the Mantissa or Sign
The error generated by the mantissa or sign bits is relative
to the exponent of the number that the flip occurred in. If the
exponent is larger than one, then clearly the mantissa or sign
bits can generate an error larger than one. Alternatively, if the
values all are less than one, then mantissa errors will produce
errors less than one because 2−1× 1.x ≤ 20. The errors from
the sign bit cannot exceed 2 since 2× 2−1 × 1.x < 21.
It is reasonable to consider that the mantissa generates
a carry, as discussed in § IV-C2. To account for this we
construct a strict upper bound by incrementing the exponent
of each element of the vectors analyzed, similar to Eq. (7).
For example,
uoriginal =
[
2.12332
1.24568
]
⇒ uupper bound =
[
4
2
]
. (9)
We then can evaluate our models on these vectors to determine
a strict upper bound on the errors we can experience in a dot
product.
B. Modeling Large Vectors
We have shown how to exhaustively examine each element
in a vector, and from this analysis we can determine precisely
which absolute errors we could experience. Given large vec-
tors, where the dimension n may have millions or billions
of elements, exhaustively searching each element would be
time consuming, but it would also be a waste of time. As
stated previously, there is a discrete number of exponents
supported by the IEEE-754 Binary64 specification. As we have
previously shown, the exponent characterizes the faults we can
observe, so we only need to consider the 2046 possible biased
exponents and the special case of zero. The perturbations that
are possible can be determined independent of concrete data
values, e.g., we can precompute the perturbations and absolute
error because we know the relation stated in Eq. (4) and
Eq. (7).
To analyze arbitrarily large vectors, we construct a lookup
table for the absolute error in whatever operation we choose to
model (we have chosen products and addition). The table size
is 2047×2047, and allows us to consider the error introduced
by performing an operation on two exponents, which will map
to a unique ij location.
For example, consider the vectors
u =

1.0
1.2
8.0
0.125
 , and v =

0.125
0.125001
0.125002
1.0
 . (10)
We first extract the biased exponents from the vectors
u⇒ uexponent =

20 × 1.0
20 × 1.x
23 × 1.0
2−3 × 1.0
⇒ ubiased =

1023
1023
1026
1020
 (11)
Now, we determine an interval of possible values, and account
for the mantissa values that may have been truncated
ui ∈ [1020, 1026] ⊆ [1020, 1027] for i = 1, . . . , 4. (12)
The range of biased exponents [1020, 1027] will contain all
possible values that the original vector contained, and include
one value that was larger than any in the vector, the number
corresponding to the biased exponent 1027. Similarly, we can
compute the interval for v
v =

0.125
0.125001
0.125002
0.25
⇒

2−3 × 1.0
2−3 × 1.x
2−3 × 1.x
2−2 × 1.0
⇒

1020
1020
1020
1021
 , (13)
which leads to the interval we consider errors
vi ∈ [1020, 1021] ⊆ [1020, 1022] for i = 1, . . . , 4. (14)
To allow us to analyze intervals efficiently, we create a lookup
table, where each entry computes the relevant perturbations
and absolute errors for the operations being modeled. In
the case of multiplication, the table has symmetry because
multiplication is commutative. In practice, computing the full
table (0, . . . , 2046) is simple and allows one to model errors
for arbitrary vectors.
A caveat of the above approach is that we must know the
range of values that the vector contains. This can be achieved
by directly computing the min and max values for each vector.
Alternatively, an approximate range can be determined if the
“length” of the vector is known, e.g., the two-norm or if we
know that the data is normalized, i.e., the two-norm is one.
One weakness to the proposed approach is that we do not
consider a flip in the accumulating sum, which we have left to
future work. We also leave to future work analysis that shows
how many of these modeled errors lie within the rounding
error bound for pairwise sums.
C. Summary
We have shown that the range of values used in the dot
product has a direct impact on the size of the errors that
can be observed. A general rule in floating point algorithms
has been to perform operations on numbers as close to the
same magnitude as possible, as doing so minimizes the loss
of precision. We have now shown that following this rule-of-
thumb also gives the benefit of making bit upsets generate
a relatively small error when the numbers are no larger than
one. Next we present a motivating case study that focuses
exclusively on dot products, and then in § VII we show how
to exploiting data scaling in an iterative solver.
VI. CASE STUDY: VECTOR DOT PRODUCTS
To begin our investigation, we assess the susceptibility of
the dot product of two N -dimensional vectors to a silent bit
flip in arithmetic. We make this choice since many linear
algebra operations can be decomposed into dot products, for
example, Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization or matrix-vector
multiplications.
A. Computational Challenges
Given a single double-precision number, there are 64 bits
that may be flipped. Extending this to an N -dimensional
vector, we have 64N bits that are candidates for flipping.
Accounting for different numbers results in a very large sample
space, and, therefore, we utilized a hybrid CPU-GPU cluster
and created a parallel code that farms out specific Monte
Carlo trials to various nodes. In this context, a trial consists
of creating two vectors, which is discussed in the follow
section, and then determining pass/fail statistics given a bit
flip on the input to the dot-product kernel. We utilized the
BLAS ddot() routine, and aggregated the output for post-
processing in MATLAB. Ensuring a sampling error of less
than 0.001, which is discussed in Section VI-D, required
nearly 400,000 CPU hours parallelized over the processors
of a 1700 core cluster of AMD 6128 Opterons. The large
search space coupled with ensuring statistically significant
results highlights why an analytic approach is not only more
efficient, but may be required for more advanced methods and
data structures, e.g., matrices and linear solvers.
B. Monte Carlo Sampling
We next develop a better understanding of how vector
magnitudes impact the expected absolute error should a bit
perturb a dot product. To conduct Monte Carlo sampling, we
must first determine a mechanism for tallying success, and we
must define success and failure.
• Vector Creation
1) Mantissa generated randomly using C stdlib rand().
2) For each vector, we fix each element’s magnitude to the
bit pattern 2−50 to 250 (101 bit patterns). This corre-
sponds to the base ten numbers in the range 8.8×10−16 to
1.1×10+15. This range was chosen because 2−50 roughly
is the machine precision. The numbers in this range are
utilizing the highest precision that Binary64 offers.
• Sample definition and Error Calculation
1) A random sample is defined by generating two random
N length vectors and computing the absolute error con-
sidering all possible 2× 64×N bit flips.
2) A tally is defined by failure, which we define to be any
absolute error that is greater than 1.
3) An empirical estimate of the expected absolute error
is computed by dividing the number of failures by the
number of bits considered times the vector length times
2 times the number of random samples (M ) taken for a
given magnitude combination, i.e., failures/(2 × 64 ×
N ×M).
• Visualization
1) To visualize the expected absolute error, we construct
tallies for each magnitude combination, i.e., 101 × 101
unique combinations, and each combination is sampled
M times.
2) We summarize this information in a surface plot, where
the x- and y-axes denote the log2 of the relative mag-
nitude of the vector u and v, respectively. The height
of the surface plot indicates the probability of seeing an
absolute error larger than 1.
Figure 6a presents a surface plot as described in the Visual-
ization bullet. To interpret this graph, the x-axis indicates the
magnitude that all elements of the vector u were forced to
have while the mantissa was randomly generated. Likewise,
the y-axis indicates the magnitude that all elements of the
vector v were forced to have. Each x-y intersection represents
1,000,000 random vector samples, where the dot product was
computed and failures tallied. The height of the surface at
an (x, y) location indicates the probability of observing an
absolute error larger than 1 given a single bit flip. From this
surface, one may immediately recognize the unusual structure
of these graphs: When both vectors have magnitudes larger
than 20, the probability of failure is noticeably higher; yet,
when both vectors have magnitudes less than or euqal to 20,
the probability of failure is approaching zero.
The key finding presented in Figure 6a, is that when we
operate on vectors that are normalized, e.g., values in the
range [0, 1], we have a very low probability of seeing a large
error should a bit flip occur. The lowest probability, i.e., the
flat region in the quadrant [0,−50] × [0,−50], is precisely
Prob(Abs Error > 1) = 0.015625, which is 1/64. The single
bit that can introduce absolute error larger than one is the
most significant exponent bit. Also, should the most significant
exponent bit flip, the error is quite large and can be detected
[15].
C. Per Bit Analysis of Surface Plot
To better understand the structure of the surface plot, we
take two slices of the surface and look at the per-bit probability
of a failure (Figures 6b and 6c). The slices chosen feature dot
products of vectors with similar relative magnitudes and dot
products of vectors of many magnitudes (the x-axis) with a
vector that contains magnitudes up to 23. Intuitively, these
figures slice from the back-most corner of Figure 6a to the
front for similar magnitudes (Figure 6b), and they slice from
the left to right for Figure 6c.
We have shown why this shape should be expected in
Figure 3, and in the example presented in § V. This feature
is an artifact of how the exponent is implemented in the
IEEE-754 specification, i.e., a biased exponent. The lowest
probability presented in the surface plot is 0.015625 = 1/64,
we can graphically show this in Figure 6b, where one can
see that bit #62 (2nd from the top), is the only bit that can
contribute large error. We also show that the sign and mantissa
bits can not introduce large error when values are in the range
[0, 1].
Conversely, Figure 6c shows that when mixing large and
small values, we expect to see large errors for faults. The
green shading in Figure 6c (upper left quadrant) indicates a
roughly 50% chance that we see an absolute error larger than
one. The reason for this is that values larger than 2 have a
binary pattern that introduces large error most of the time
(recall Figure 4).The increased likelihood of large error from
the large numbers, coupled with the low chance from small
numbers, creates a scenario where it is equally likely to see
both large and small absolute errors. The more we deviate
from operating on numbers in the range [0, 1], the closer we
get to having a 50/50 chance of seeing a large error (see the
mantissa bits slowly becoming green as well).
D. Comparison of the Analytic Model and Monte Carlo Sam-
pling
In Figure 7, we compare the error observed while perform-
ing Monte Carlo sampling with the expected error computed
from our model. We sampled up to M = 1 million random
vectors per data point, which implies a Monte Carlo error of
errorMC = 1/
√
M ≈ 0.001. We observe a perfect fit, which
is to be expected because we have analytically shown that the
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(b) Dot product with vectors containing
similar magnitudes.
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Fig. 6: Probability of observing an absolute error larger than 1.
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Fig. 7: Comparison of observed error caused by a flip in
the exponent, excluding the most significant bit, for sampled
vector sizes having similar relative magnitudes.
exponent bits dictate the size of the absolute error we will
observe. Even with random sign and mantissa bits evaluated,
we see that the likelihood of experiencing a large error is
entirely determined by the exponent bits.
VII. EXTENSION TO MATRICES AND ITERATIVE SOLVERS
Having recognized that dot products on numbers less than
one can produce errors less than one, we will relate this idea
to matrix equilibration. We then provide an example of how
to use this concept in an sparse iterative solver (GMRES),
while exhaustively counting the possible errors that can be
introduced.
A. Matrix Equilibration
The idea of scaled vectors is analogous to vector normal-
ization, i.e., ‖u‖2 = 1. Applied to matrices in the context
of solving linear systems, scaling takes the form of matrix
equilibration: for a matrix A, scale the rows and columns such
that ‖A‖∞ = 1. Scaling can also be performed before a matrix
is created, for example the equations leading to the matrix can
be scaled prior to assembling a matrix. To scale a sparse matrix
after its creation, we use a sparse matrix implementation of
LAPACK’s equilibration routine DGEEQU [27]. Equilibration
does not cause fill, i.e., it will not increase the number of non-
zeros. In general, equilibrating a matrix is only beneficial, but
equilibration may not be practical in all cases.
B. GMRES
The Generalized Minimum Residual method (GMRES) of
Saad and Schultz [28] is a Krylov subspace method for solving
large, sparse, possibly non-symmetric linear systems Ax = b.
GMRES is based on the Arnoldi process [29], which uses
orthogonal projections and basis vectors normalized to length
one. Arnoldi and GMRES relate to this work because the
orthogonalization phase of Arnoldi is often Modified Gram-
Schmidt or Classical Gram-Schmidt, which are dot product
heavy kernels.
We present the GMRES algorithm in Algorithm 1. The
Arnoldi process is expressed on Lines 3–14 in Algorithm 1. At
its core is the Modified Gram-Schmidt (MGS) process, which
constructs a vector orthogonal to all previous basis vectors qi.
The MGS process begins on Line 5 and completes on Line 8.
We now describe how we instrument the orthogonalization
phase and count the absolute errors that could be injected.
C. Instrumentation and Evaluation
To demonstrate the benefit of data scaling we have chosen 3
test matrices. We instrument the code and for each dot product
in the orthogonalization phase we determine an interval that
describes the range of values possible in the vectors. Then
Algorithm 1 GMRES
Input: Linear system Ax = b and initial guess x0
Output: Approximate solution xm for some m ≥ 0
1: r0 := b−Ax0 . Initial residual vector
2: β := ‖r0‖2, q1 := r0/β
3: for j = 1, 2, . . . until convergence do
4: vj+1 := Aqj . Apply the matrix A
5: for i = 1, 2, . . . , j do . Orthogonalize
6: hi,j := qi · vj+1
7: vj+1 := vj+1 − hi,jqi
8: end for
9: hj+1,j := ‖vj+1‖2
10: if hj+1,j ≈ 0 then
11: Solution is xj−1 . Happy breakdown
12: return
13: end if
14: qj+1 := vj+1/hj+1,j . New basis vector
15: yj := arg min
y
‖H(1:j + 1, 1:j)y − βe1‖2
16: xj := x0 + [q1,q2, . . . ,qj ]yj . Compute solution
update
17: end for
using our fault model, we compute the absolute errors that are
possible. Since we know the basis vectors (qi) are normal, the
intervals for the values in the vectors are [0,1]. We compute the
min and max for the unknown vector v, and this determines the
interval for the values in v. We use the intervals and our fault
model to evaluate all absolute errors that can be introduced
from a single bit flip in the input vectors. We classify the
absolute error into four classes:
1) Absolute error less than 1.0,
2) Absolute error greater than or equal to 1.0, but less than
or equal to ‖A‖2,
3) Absolute error greater ‖A‖2.
4) Error that is non-numeric, e.g., Inf or NaN.
We choose to include the 2nd class of errors due to recent
work by by Elliott et al. [15] that demonstrates how to use a
norm bound on the Arnoldi process to filter out large errors
in orthogonalization.
Classes 1 and 2 are undetectable, while Classes 3 and 4 are
detectable. Our goal is to ensure that should a bit flip, the error
falls into Classes 1, 3, and 4 while minimizing or eliminating
the occurrence of Class 2 errors. We refer to Class 2 errors as
the grey area, as they are undetectable errors that we consider
to be large.
1) Sample Problems: We have chosen three sample matri-
ces to demonstrate our technique. To ensure reproducibility,
we did not create any of these matrices from scratch, rather
we used readily available matrices. The first matrix arises
from a second-order centered finite difference discretization
of the Poisson equation. We generated this matrix using
MATLAB’s built-in Gallery functionality. The second matrix,
CoupCons3D, presents a more realistic linear system. It comes
from the University of Florida Sparse Matrix Collection [30]
and arises from a fully coupled poroelastic problem. The
matrix is symmetric in pattern, but not symmetric in values.
It is also fairly large, and has explicitly stored zero values.
The matrix is poorly scaled, with a mixture of large and
small values. The final matrix, mult dcop 03, is also from
the Florida Sparse Matrix Collection. It arises from a circuit
simulation problem, and has good scaling inherently. We have
summarized the characteristics of each matrix in Table II.
TABLE II: Sample Matrices
Properties Poisson100 CoupCons3D mult dcop 03
number of rows 10,000 416,800 25,187
number of columns 10,000 416,800 25,187
nonzeros 49,600 17,277,420 193,216
structural full rank yes yes yes
explicit zero entries 0 5,044,916 0
type real real real
structure symmetric nonsymmetric nonsymmetric
positive definite yes no no
We now scale the Poisson and CoupCons3D matrices and
right-hand side vectors such that they are equilibrated. Ta-
ble III summarizes the norms for each of our test matrices.
We use the infinity norm (‖A‖∞ ≈ 1) to measure whether
a matrix is well scaled. One can see that both the Poisson
and mult dcop 03 matrices have infinity norms not too much
larger than one, while the CoupCons3D matrix is inherently
poorly scaled. Our equilibration code ran out of memory when
attempting to equilibrate mult dcop 03, but it is already well
scaled.
TABLE III: Norms of Sample Matrices †
Norm Poisson Equation CoupCons3D
No Scaling Scaling No Scaling Scaling
‖A‖∞ 8.0 2.0 1.30× 106 1.0‖A‖2 7.999 1.999 1.20× 106 1.0‖A‖F 4.46× 102 1.12× 102 2.75× 106 2.91× 102
† mult dcop 03 has ‖A‖∞ = 35.5.
D. Results
We ran Algorithm 1 for 1000 total iterations, using a
restart value of 25. By instrumenting the code, we determined
the numerical range of values each vector contained, and
then computed the possible absolute error that a bit flip
could introduce. We classified the absolute error according
to § VII-C, and counted each class of errors for the duration
of the algorithm. Figure 8 shows how these errors map to
our classes of errors when the matrices are scaled versus not
scaled.
A large proportion of the absolute errors possible in orthog-
onalization fall into Class 1 (undetectable and small). We can
explain this distribution given that the vectors qi are normal-
ized (a side effect of GMRES being derived from the Arnoldi
process). Given normalized vectors, we know that of all the
dot products in Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, at least one
of the vectors has data in the interval [0, 1]. We previously
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Fig. 8: Number of possible absolute errors from dot products in Algorithm 1 in orthogonalization kernel. Class 1: err < 1.0
(blue), Class 2: 1.0 ≥ err ≤ ‖A‖2 (light blue), Class 3: ‖A‖2 > err (yellow), and Class 4: Non-numeric (red).
established that the interval [0, 1] aids in minimizing absolute
error if a bit perturbs a dot product. Now, we show how
equilibrating the input matrices can assist in forcing the non-
normalized vector (vj+1) as close as possible to being in the
normalized interval.
The results show the benefits of using well-scaled matrices.
Figures 8a and 8e show the Poisson problem (with no equili-
bration) and the mult dcop 03 matrices, which both have good
scaling (see Table III). These problems experience a higher
distribution of absolute errors less than one than the poorly
scaled CoupCons3D matrix (see Figure 8b). For the matrices
that can be equilibrated, we see that scaling the input matrices
is never detrimental, and will only improve fault tolerance,
e.g., compare CoupCons3D before scaling in Figure 8b versus
after scaling in Figure 8d.
The pie charts are not probabilistic, that is, they do not
convey the likelihood of observing such an error. Rather, these
charts characterize the possible errors when given specific
data. Consider an arbitrary length vector x, we can determine
the range of values in the vector, e.g., xi ∈ [a, b], but we
do not know how many of each value, or in what order
they occur. Obtaining fine-grained statistics would involve
evaluating every element of the vector, or constructing a
probabilistic model that captures the distribution of values in
each vector.
Since we consider the impact of a single bit flip, it is
sufficient to follow the methodology presented in § V. That is,
we may not know the distribution and order of numbers in the
vectors, but we can model every possible error by assuming
that each value in the interval could be used in an operation
with every value of the other interval. This Cartesian product
guarantees that we have counted all possible errors for IEEE-
754 double precision numbers in an interval, including errors
that may not occur because the vector does not contain that
specific number, or because of the ordering.
1) Error Distribution: Our results show that scaling tends
to produce a distribution of absolute error that is roughly 91%
less than or equal to one, while 9% are non-numeric. This is
expected when most of the numbers are near one. Flipping the
most significant exponent bit produces 11111111111, which
will generate a non-numeric value. Similarly, the 10 remaining
exponent bits will produce error less than one — that is,
1/11 ≈ 9% and 10/11 ≈ 91%. As previously discussed, the
mantissa errors are determined entirely by the exponent bits.
E. Multiple Bit Flips
While this work intentionally focuses on single bit flips, the
key finding that normalized data is better to operate on when
performing dot products, gives some insight into how multiple
bit flips in data may behave. For example, we know that a
fault in the fractional component of a floating point number
will produce an absolute error bound above by the order of
magnitude of the original value. That is, we could flip all 52
bits of the mantissa and the error bound from our model would
still be valid (e.g., Eq. (8) or Eq.(4)). In regard to exponent
flips, we have shown both analytically and experimentally that
when operating on normalized values, only 1 exponent bit per
64 bit value can introduce large error. Should the values all be
normalized, flipping 1→ 0 will minimize the value subject to
Table I. Experiencing more than a single bit flip would only
serve to “shrink” the value even more. We intentionally do not
speculate about how and why multiple bit flips can occur, but
we have shown that operating on normalized values skews the
probability of experiencing large error.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Our results indicate a clear benefit to good scaling. We have
shown that a widely used numerical method (the Arnoldi pro-
cess coupled with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization) inherently
minimizes absolute error in dot products. Furthermore, stan-
dard matrix equilibration algorithms can be used to scale input
matrices, which further enhance the inherent robustness of
the Arnoldi process. We demonstrated our theoretical finding
experimentally by instrumenting the GMRES iterative solver,
which is based on the Arnoldi process.
We cannot enforce that data are always normalized. Some
linear systems may be inherently poorly scaled, or it may be
impractical to equilibrate them. We can advocate that scaling,
while typically used to improve numerical stability and reduce
the loss of precision, can also benefit fault resilience. We have
shown that this result has broad applicability, because many
iterative solvers are based on orthogonal projections using
normalized vectors, i.e., they create an orthonormal basis.
While this work does not propose an end-to-end solution to
soft errors, it does indicate that data scaling can help mitigate
the impact of such errors should they occur.
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